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Indian Fiscal Federalism at the Crossroads:  
Some Reflections  
 
Lekha Chakraborty1 
 
Abstract  
 
There is a growing recognition that something “fundamental” is happening in Indian fiscal 
federalism ex-post to the institutional changes like the abolition of the Planning Commission; 
creation of the NITI Aayog; the Constitutional amendment to introduce GST and the establishment 
of GST Council; and the historic high tax devolution to the States based on the recommendations 
of the Fourteenth Finance Commission. Recently the policy makers and experts have raised a few 
issues, which are (i) to make Finance Commissions permanent or to abolish the Finance 
Commissions by making the tax devolution share constant through Constitutional Amendment, 
(ii) the need for an institution to redress spatial inequalities, to fill in the vacuum created by 
abolishing the Planning Commission, and (iii) arguing the case for Article 282 of the Constitution 
to be circumscribed. The debates are also focused on whether there is a need establish a link 
between GST Council and Finance Commissions and should India devise a mechanism of transfer 
                                                 
1This paper is prepared on the basis of the issues flagged in the book launch of “Indian Fiscal Federalism” written by Y 
V Reddy (former Governor, Reserve Bank of India and Chairman, Fourteenth Finance Commission) and G R Reddy 
(Advisor to Government of Telangana). The book was released by N K Singh, the Chairman of the Fifteenth Finance 
Commission. I was one of the panelists to the launching of the book along with Bibek Debroy (Chairman, Prime Minister’s 
Economic Advisory Council), Montek Singh Ahluwalia (former Planning Commission Vice Chairman) and Haseeb Drabu 
(former Finance Minister of Jammu and Kashmir). The event was jointly organized by ICRIER and Oxford University 
Press. This book was launched at India International Centre, New Delhi on March 28th 2019.  
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which is predominantly based on sharing of grants for equalization of services rather than tax 
sharing. What could be a plausible framework for debt-deficit dynamics keeping intact the fiscal 
autonomy of States and to ensure “output gap” reduction and public investment at the subnational 
level, without creating bad equilibrium was also another matter of concern. These debates attain 
significance, especially when for the first time ever a group of States came together to question 
the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the 15th Finance Commission and there is a growing tension in 
the Centre-State relations in India.  
 
Keywords: Fiscal federalism, Finance Commission, revenue sharing, fiscal equalization, GST, 
public debt, fiscal rules 
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Indian Fiscal Federalism at the Crossroads:  
Some Reflections 
 
A google search for “Indian Fiscal Federalism” shows 1.7 million results. The top hit among these 
results was the recent book on the topic written by Y V Reddy and G R Reddy.   Recent 
“murmurings”  that are happening in our country about fiscal federalism  as listed out by Y. V. 
Reddy are the following:  (a) the chapter in the book “Of Counsel” written by the former Chief 
Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian about the need for a new federalism framework2; (b) 
former Finance Secretary and Chairman of Thirteenth Finance Commission, Vijay Kelkar’s 
concerns about growing  spatial inequalities3;  (c) former Chairman, Prime Minister’s Economic 
Advisory Council and Chairman, Twelfth Finance Commission Chairperson Chakravarty 
Rangarajan’s urge to make the magnitude of devolution mandatory through Constitutional 
Amendment in the post-GST era4; and  (d) RBI Governor Shaktikanta Das’s  view to make the 
Finance Commissions permanent5; and (e) the growing “trust deficit” of States and the first time 
ever conclave by the State Finance Ministers6 on the TOR of 15th Finance Commission. This book 
on “Indian Fiscal Federalism’ (herafter IFF) is an acknowledgement of the fact that something 
“fundamental” was happening in Indian fiscal federalism. It has given emphasis to these 
developments with empirical evidence. The “hysteresis” of fiscal federalism was analyzed to get 
the contemporary debates right.  
                                                 
2 Subramanian, 2018.https://penguin.co.in/book/non-fiction/of-counsel/ 
3 Kelkar, 2019. https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/01/WP_252_2019.pdf 
4 The Hindu, March 4th, 2019. https://www.thehindu.com/business/bring-in-constitutional-amendment-on-gst-
revenue-sharing-proportion-rangarajan/article26475474.ece 
5 RBI, March 2019. https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1070 
6 The Hindu, May 14th, 2018. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/an-open-letter-to-finance-
ministers/article23874674.ece  
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I 42 % tax devolution: Is it really a Game Changer? 
 
The historic 42 % devolution of Centre’s divisible tax pool to the States, recommended by the 
Fourteenth Finance Commission (herafter 14th FC), the highest ever till date, was hailed by 
Government, and the scholars in India and abroad alike.  Y V Reddy, the Chairperson of the 14th 
FC meticulously explained the history of Indian fiscal federalism, inclusive of States’ point of 
view and with a “practioner’s perspective” on “how has 14th FC arrived at doing a great thing?”. 
He has also consolidated the types of criticisms he had encountered. The first criticism is the States 
have “so much resources” ex-post 14th FC, that Centre has lost its fiscal space. The second 
criticism is that the local bodies did not get their due. On the first criticism, he reiterated that it is 
factually incorrect, and clarified that the real rise in terms of comparable basis intertemporally was 
not from 32 % to 42%, but from 39% to 42%7. As far as local bodies are concerned, he highlighted 
that more than 50% of the grants recommended by the 14th FC were for the local bodies.  He 
explained that perhaps the “mistake” done by 14th FC was in not assigning “conditionality” to 
these grants. If we look at the aggregate transfers to the States as a percentage of Gross Revenue 
of the Central Government (See Figure 1), it has remained constant over the years.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The Commission subsumed normal plan assistance, special plan assistance, special central assistance and also state-
specific grants. https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/15th-finance-commission-to-realise-the-goals-under-new-
india-2022-here-is-what-centre-must-remember/960819/  
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Figure 1: Ratio of Aggregate Transfers to States to Gross Revenue Receipts of Central 
Government (in %) 
 
 
Source: Union Budgets (various years), Government of India 
 
II. 7th Schedule (Article 246) and Article 282  
A concern whether the labyrinth of “entitlement-based central legislations” (for instance, Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005, the Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act 2009 and the National Food Security Act 2013) conflict with the 7th 
Schedule of the Constitution (based on Article 246) was one of the highlights on federalism debate 
(Singh, N K 2019).   
The 7th schedule of the Constitution clearly lays down the subjects for the Union List, the 
concurrent list and the State List with the exception that each will respect so to say the territorial 
limits of the other. Over the years, there has been a transgression of Centre into State subjects 
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through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) and enlargement of Concurrent List (page 76, IFF) 
on the grounds that such spending will serve national priorities better. It was cautioned that through 
this process, the fiscal autonomy of State was severely circumscribed. Singh, N K (2019) pointed 
out that the “original sin” was during the First Five Year Plan when Damodar Valley, Bhakra 
Nangal and similar schemes in the State’s domain were funded by the Centre. This 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer (IGFT) outside the purview of Finance Commissions is the most 
sensitive part of Centre-State fiscal relations in India as the States feel that these transfers are large, 
discretionary, arbitrary and regressive (page 77, IFF).  Have things changed after the 14th FC 
award? The answer is mixed. As evident from the Figure 2, the share of general purpose transfers 
which are unconditional has increased from 51.41 per cent of the total transfers to around 60 per 
cent of the total with a corresponding decline in the specific purpose or conditional transfers. 
However, this is misleading. Though there is an apparent increase in the general purpose transfers, 
effective increase will be much less due to the increase in States’ contribution to centrally 
sponsored schemes (Chakraborty, Pinaki et al, 2018).      
Fig 2:    General & Specific Purpose Transfers (% of Aggregate Transfers) 
 
Source: Chakraborty, et al. (2018) 
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 The Article 282 of the constitution which says “The Union or a State may make any grants for 
any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament 
or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may make laws.” Though Article 282 embodies 
merely a residuary power, it has been misused totally outside the frames of Constitution. How to 
resolve this contradiction which creates dichotomy in the functions of Finance Commission, which 
requires wider debate (Singh, N K 2019). With the tax devolution of 42 % and the rationalization 
of CSS prior to the abolition of Planning Commission, there is a “triumph of experience over 
expectations” (page 74, IFF). The cesses and surcharges, and the non-tax revenue are kept outside 
the divisible pool, which can lead to clever financial engineering by undercutting the spirit of 
evolution (Singh, N K 2019).  
The need for an institutional mechanism like “Fiscal Council” to enforce fiscal rules and keep a 
check on Centre’s fiscal consolidation was highlighted. A need for consolidated fiscal roadmap 
for both Centre and States, with same rules of the game, for both (Singh, N K 2019). Another 
concern is that there is no constitutional check over borrowings for the Centre. Only for state 
government liabilities, Article 293 (3) provides a constitutional check over borrowings.  
The 15th Finance Commission will be the first Commission which will be writing on a “clean slate” 
(Ahluwaliah, Montek Singh 2019). He said 14th FC contributed to it making a clean slate by 
providing substantial tax devolution, and he gave credit to the Government for accepting the 
recommendations. He also highlighted the irony that we got rid of the unconditional grants, but 
the CSS continued.  He proposed a very different way of doing horizontal share, by focusing on 
education and health. “If we can design something which says each citizen in the state must get 
“x” Rs of money as grant to take care of health, and “y” Rs to take care of education, and 
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multiplied that by the population, and say this is the grant a state is going to get. Having decided 
on the grant, divide the divisible pool so that the totals must add up. The biggest advantage of this 
will be , the you will be earmarking the allocation for health and education , to heath ad education, 
he said. The big problem with the dividing up of revenues as shares is that you are leaving it 
entirely to states how to “spend” it , he explained. This is, from a federal point of view, totally 
acceptable.”   And he also said that many States have strongly objected the centrally sponsored 
schemes (CSS). If you want to do get away from “revenue sharing”, he suggested that one can go 
for “equal per capita”. That will be mostly progressive, because the large population States will 
gain a lot, and also it will create a basis to say that States should do their job on health and 
education, which States are visibly not doing, he added. This is the only thing that is different from 
revenue sharing, this has never been tried before, he said. Every Indian citizen has a right to have 
certain amount of money for health and education. If anything has to fit in, the politics has to be 
“genuinely federal”, he commented. He said that if you do not get the things Central Government 
and State Government have to do right, you cannot solve the devolution problem as central 
government end up doing everything. 
III. The TOR of 15th FC   
A group of States for the first time ever has raised issues about the TOR of Finance Commission. 
The authors of IFF noted that 15th FC “would have the courage and wisdom to be guided by the 
letter and spirit of the Constitutional provisions in discharging its responsibilities and upholding 
the sanctity of the institution.” N K Singh, the Chairman of 15th Finance Commission has confined 
to only responding to the comments on TOR that “it is the President’s prerogative to 
determine both the wording and the context of the TOR assigned to the Commission.  And it is the 
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prerogative of the Commission to address them in a manner that it considers appropriate.  The 
Commission is not obliged to agree but the Commission is obliged to address the specific reference 
which have been made to it.  In doing so we are inherently bound by past precedence and the 
contours of our constitutional obligations.” 
IV. Fiscal Marksmanship and “Continuity” through Australian Model of continuous Grants 
Commission 
 
It was equivocally flagged that fiscal federalism is a dynamic process so to say ‘a Work in Motion.’ 
A question was raised whether there is a need to have a recourse mechanism for mid-term 
correction (similar to Australian Model of continuous Grants Commission) to revisit “state 
relativities” every year, in case the tyranny of the Finance Commission be inflicted on the 
assumptions of macro-fiscal parameters and the macroeconomic models in terms of projections 
(Singh, N K 2019). The chapter in IFF titled “The Detail Matters” has analysed whether any 
significant deviations between forecasts and the actuals. However, given the fact that some States 
have raised concerns about the State GDP numbers used by the FCs, the unrealistic revenue 
projections and expenditure compression, it is important to undertake systematic fiscal 
marksmanship analysis. The importance of reality checks was highlighted to analyse whether the 
perception among many States that Finance Commission lacks marksmanship while forecasting 
the revenue and the expenditure of the Centre vis-a-vis the states (Reddy, G R 2019). He narrated 
that from the analysis of last few years Finance Commissions - when the forecasts are compared 
with the actual outcomes – they found that the allegations against the Finance Commissions were 
absolutely incorrect, and whatever approach that was adopted by the Finance Commissions was 
uniformly applied for the forecasts, for arriving at the forecasts for the centre as well as States. All 
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awards of the Finance Commission are based on realistic assumptions on what is an acceptable 
macro-economic model in terms of key parameters like revenue projections, State GDP growth, 
permissible expenditure growth etc. (Singh. N K, 2019).  
 
Table 1: Partitioning the Sources of Fiscal Forecasting Error 
Ex_ante Fiscal Rules Bias Unequal 
variation 
Random 
Revenue Receipts 0.24 0.07 0.69 
Capital Receipts 0.45 0.14 0.41 
Revenue Expenditure 0.05 0.15 0.80 
Capital Expenditure 0.06 0.22 0.72 
Revenue Deficit 0.36 0.01 0.63 
Fiscal Deficit 0.31 0.01 0.68 
Primary Deficit 0.32 0.00 0.67 
Ex_post Fiscal  Rules 
 
Bias Unequal 
variation 
Random 
Revenue Receipts 0.01 0.04 0.95 
Revenue Expenditure 0.00 0.31 0.69 
Capital Expenditure 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Revenue Deficit 0.04 0.01 0.96 
Fiscal Deficit 0.02 0.01 0.97 
Primary Deficit 0.05 0.02 0.93 
Source: Chakraborty and Sinha, 2018 
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Technically, researchers can use these empirics provided in IFF to analyse the magnitude of errors 
of macro-fiscal variables, and the source of errors of Finance Commission projections (whether it 
is a “random error” and beyond the control of fiscal forecaster, or whether the “errors are systemic 
and biased”) (Chakraborty, Lekha 2019). We can also analyse whether the magnitude of errors 
was higher for revenue or expenditure; and whether for capital budget or revenue budget. However, 
as indicated in Table 1, forecasting errors is not something just confined to Finance Commissions, 
it is analysed for Centre and State Budgets as well. The source of such errors in forecasting for the 
parameters are largely of random in nature (Table 1) which is beyond the purview of the policy 
makers.  
 
IX. How to Address the Issue of Development Deficit in Indian Federal Fiscal System?           
 Is there a need for an institution to redress spatial inequalities, to fill in the vacuum created by 
abolishing the Planning Commission? One aspect that did not receive adequate recognition in the 
context of “what holds India together” is the role of Finance Commissions8. The IFF rightly 
highlights the significance of the existing institutional mechanisms for providing “predictability in 
the federal fiscal relations” along with the smooth transition of political regimes through peaceful 
elections, State Re-organization mechanisms and the other institutions of economic management.  
The IFF throws light into these aspects of “asymmetric” and “co-operative” federalism in India.  
There was “continuity”. There was “change”. The effectiveness of such processes in creating 
“convergence” is an empirical question. Such empirical questions have gained significance 
                                                 
8 https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/15th-finance-commission-what-really-holds-india-
together/1062389/ 
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globally. In Brooking Papers (2017)9 there was a similar analysis of “economic convergence” 
about whether “Europe as a political project too ambitious?” They have found that there is a great 
extent of “economic convergence” within the European Union, despite widening cultural and 
institutional heterogeneities within an “economically integrated” Europe. However, the “cultural 
divergence” – “nationalism” – is the stumbling block. Such issues have started appearing even in 
the well-functioning federations like the US, with “protectionist” policies. In India, has the 
“equality of processes” in fiscal federalism resulted in “equality of outcomes”? Has this goal of 
economic convergence been achieved, with poor States “catching up” in growth with the richer 
States in India? Existing empirical evidence is mixed10. There is “convergence” in social sector 
outcomes, but there is no “economic convergence” (Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 2018). Further 
empirical research is required in this area, incorporating fiscal federal variables, especially ex-post 
to the phasing out of Planning Commission transfers which were designed to address such spatial 
inequalities. However, it was cautioned that the convergence does not happen if States get more 
money, but it is the totality of a State’s policy (Ahluwaliah, Montek Singh 2019).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/alesinatextsp17bpea.pdf 
 
10 Chakraborty, Lekha and Pinaki Chakraborty, 2018. “Federalism, fiscal asymmetries and economic 
convergence: evidence from Indian States”, Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science (2018-04-01) 2: 
83-113, Springer. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs41685-018-0087-z 
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Box 1: 
Fiscal Asymmetries and Economic Convergence 
Theoretically federations are seen as ‘indestructible union of indestructible states’. However 
empirical evidence show that such federations are rare. In a federal set up, there are political 
asymmetries and economic asymmetries.  India has 29 States and these States are at asymmetric 
levels of socio-economic development. These asymmetries are vertical and horizontal. The 
vertical symmetries are the imbalances between Centre and the States in terms of complex 
outcome of constitutional division of resources and responsibilities across levels of 
governments. The horizontal asymmetries are the imbalances across the States. Chakraborty and 
Chakraborty (2018) tried to analyse whether there is economic convergence across States in 
India over the years controlling for asymmetries in fiscal and social outcomes. Economic 
convergence means that a state that starts off at low growth performance levels should see a 
“catching-up” growth process with the states which had better start. Empirical evidences are 
inconclusive about economic convergence.  Against the backdrop of federal asymmetries in 
terms of gross capital formation, social and demographic outcomes, and differentials in public 
capital budgeting, Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2018) provided empirical evidence that 
unconditional convergence failed to show evidence of poorer states “catching up” with the 
richer states. Conditional convergence tests also show no evidences of strong economic 
convergence among Indian States. A separate analysis of coastal and inland states is also 
undertaken by the authors to analyse economic convergence as it has been observed in 
literature that “economic geography” plays a crucial role in the development of a region. The 
results show that public capital expenditure has positive and significant effect on growth, for 
both the coastal and inland regions. Health outcome proxied by Infant Mortality Rate shows 
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that improvement in health outcome results in higher economic growth. These results have 
two important policy implications. One, if the path to fiscal consolidation is achieved through 
curtailing public capital spending by the States, it would have negative consequences on 
economic growth in the long run. Two, the quality of human capital formation is a pre-
requisite for economic growth. The results show that health related variables matter for 
economic convergence among States in India, and therefore public investment in health can 
be growth-enhancing, both for club and (aggregate) conditional convergence. 
Source: Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 2018 
 
 
The IFF has effectively analysed the how the formation of States, economic convergence and the 
efficiency-equity principles have influenced the thought processes of Finance Commissions 
intertemporally. Do you think we have “empirically” answered all the questions pertaining to 
Indian fiscal federalism the book highlights? The answer is “No”. One of such crucial empirical 
questions is about the reliance of an economy on history. The IFF delves deep into the significance 
of history of Indian fiscal federalism in understanding the contemporary debates – and such 
analysis is rare in federalism literature in India. When global recession gripped the schools of 
thought in economics, the macroeconomists have started realizing the reliance of financial 
economics on history. However, we still do not understand very well the significance of the impact 
of this “hysteresis” in the evolution of fiscal federal design on macroeconomic stability, growth 
and development (Chakraborty, 2019). 
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X. Progressivity of the transfers  
 
There is a debate about the significance of conditional versus unconditional fiscal transfers. Some 
economists believed a quick rebound of economy to “global goals” and economic convergence 
through designing a plethora of “conditional transfers”, while some others raise concerns over such 
transfers which are broadly of “one size fits all” design (Chakraborty, 2019). They highlighted the 
lack of State capacity (and the subnational finance matching component) to implement such 
transfers and suggested “unconditionality” in fiscal transfers. The IFF highlights these questions 
and remain “stoic” about it, leaving a cue that researchers need to examine it empirically – 
scientifically – through the “progressivity” analysis of tax transfers versus grants.  
 
XI. State level Public Debt and FRBM 
 
On Public Debt, the IFF recalls the extensive recourse to “seigniorage financing” – the automatic 
monetization – since 1957 by providing net RBI credit to the government to finance deficits, and 
the subsequent shift in the financing pattern from money-financing to bond-financing since 1990s, 
ex-post to the “economic reforms”. At the State level, the IFF further points out that “fiscal rules” 
determine State’s access to debt, subject to the approval of Central government. It is interesting to 
recall the changing perceptions on public debt in macroeconomic debates globally. The recent 
FRBM/rule-based fiscal policy in India stipulates 60 per cent threshold for public debt as part of 
fiscal consolidation.  An empirical question I could gather here is whether State’s access to public 
debt, though “not good”, can be “so bad”? Of course the answer is “it is context-specific”.  So 
what could be the plausible analytical frameworks to be considered when a Finance Commission 
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take steps towards public debt management? This portion on “Public Debt” in the IFF has 
reminded me the Presidential Address11 by Oliver Blanchard in American Economic Association 
(AEA) meetings in Atlanta in January 2019 which I have attended. In his talk, he had put it upfront 
that “public debt has no fiscal costs if real rate of interest is not greater than real rate of growth of 
economy”. He also highlighted that high public debt is not catastrophic if “more debt” can be 
justified by clear benefits like public investment or “output gap” reduction. (Output gap is the 
difference between actual GDP and potential GDP). He also highlighted the “hysteresis effects” 
(the persistent impact of short-run fluctuations on the long-term potential output) and suggested 
that a temporary fiscal expansion during a contraction could even reduce debt on a longer horizon. 
There is an increasing recognition of the fact that public investment has suffered from fiscal 
consolidation across advanced and emerging economies12. This is particularly important, when 
public investment is one of the crucial determinants in strengthening private corporate investment 
in the context of emerging economies13. Blanchard mentioned that if we are worried about a “bad 
equilibrium”, it is better to have a “contingent fiscal rule” (which may not need to be used) rather 
than steady fiscal consolidation. Similarly, the IFF noted that “a uniform and rigid fiscal rule not 
only undermine the fiscal autonomy of the States, but would also result in “public (developmental) 
expenditure compression” to comply with numerical threshold ratio”. This is refreshing, especially 
                                                 
11 The speech is posted in https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/public-debt-and-low-
interest-rates and paper is available at 
https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2019conference/program/pdf/14020_paper_etZgfbDr.pdf . The 
policy brief of the paper can be accessed at  
12 In my paper co-authored with Vinod H and H Karun titled “Encouraging private corporate 
investment” (Elsevier: Handbook of Statistics, edited by H Vinod and C R Rao, 2019 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169716119300033?via%3Dihub ), using 
maximum entropy ensembles bootstrapping , we found that public (infrastructure) investment is the 
significant determinant of private corporate investment.  
 
13 There is no financial crowding out through real interest rate mechanisms. (Chakraborty, Lekha 
2016: ‘Fiscal Consolidation, Budget deficits and Macro economy, New Delhi: Sage Publications). 
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in the context when the path towards fiscal consolidation is equally important as the debt target 
thresholds, because the fiscal consolidation through strengthening the tax buoyancy than public 
expenditure compression can be less detrimental to economic growth. However the “output gap” 
can be a difficult notion for Finance Commission. Extreme precaution is required when we 
measure “deficits”. It may be incorrect to think that “cyclical neutral fiscal deficit” instead of fiscal 
deficit, is what Finance Commissions need to focus. The empirical literature flags that we do not 
know whether “disruptions” or “downturns” permanently depress the level of output and 
employment or whether the economy can bounce back to its initial upward trend after a decline 
(the notion of “business cycle”). Gita Gopinath (Chief Economist, IMF) in her co-authored work14 
flagged that in emerging economies, there could be a “drop” from the trend growth than a 
“deviation” from the trend and she calls it “cycle is the trend”. If empirical research proves that in 
Indian context “business cycle does not exist”, then Finance Commission using the cyclicality of 
deficits can be challenging. Here is why Finance Commissions so far have resisted from using 
such sophisticated notions of “cyclical” and “structural” deficits. Finance Commissions cannot 
incorrectly assume that an upturn in business cycle can eliminate the “cyclical” part of deficit, 
while such things cannot happen if there is no return of economic growth cycle to prior trend 
growth path and therefore the buoyancy of revenue receipts could remain below the prior-potential 
level.15  
 
 
                                                 
14 https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gopinath/files/cycleisthetrend.pdf 
 
15 The empirical literature has noted that this could be true of Central Bank in case of the usage of 
“output gap” in inflation targeting.  
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XII. The third tier  
 
The IFF has given importance to fiscal decentralisation. When it comes to third tier, the real issue 
is “unfunded mandates”. To analyse this empirically, we need reliable data at the third tier. In 
India, general government data is a challenge. IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) gives 
cross-country data on general government (Chakraborty, 2019). However, we need to build up the 
third tier fiscal data. The role of State Finance Commissions (SFCs) also need to be emphasized 
for their significance in providing steady flow of funds to the local self-governments. The SFC has 
a prominent role in making the devolution less “arbitrary” and less “ad hoc” at the third tier. There 
is an increasing concern about the arbitrariness and ad-hocism of fiscal transfers at the third tier. 
Isher Judge Ahluwaliah has eloquently narrated the significance of Finance Commissions giving 
importance to the third tier, and especially the resource requirements of municipalities and the 
formation of cities.  Montek Singh Ahluwaliah also mentioned about the third tier. He said, 
successful economic growth and employment happen only when successful agglomerations are 
created, which can drive investment. What municipalities get as revenue is just one per cent of 
GDP. In other emerging economies, it is 5 per cent of GDP. The debates are confined to Centre 
State devolution, there is a traction required whether States devolving its resources to third tier. 
This is an area where finances are required and can earmark a part of devolution to go to 
municipalities, as Chief Ministers never take interest in cities other than metropolitan areas. Bibek 
Debroy also has emphasized on fiscal decentralisation. Against the backdrop of the Seventh 
Schedule, he urged that we should debate not just the role of Union Finance Commissions, but 
also about the State Finance Commissions in the devolution of funds to all local bodies. Debroy 
noted that, “We are mostly reacting to the Constitution as it stands. We are reacting to Finance 
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Commissions assuming the Constitution is the way it is today. But the evolution of the Constitution 
was a historical process. The evolution of the Constitution was insipient in a way in the 
Government of India Act 1935.  The reason I am flagging this the Finance Commission and the 
fiscal federalism is not just about the tax side, it is also about the expenditure side. So it is also 
about the Seventh Schedule.” Debroy narrated that we have a mechanism to take decision through 
GST Council, which is at present limited to a variety of indirect taxes. He flagged a point that we 
should seriously think about expenditure, “whether it is optimal level at which expenditure takes 
place in terms of the Seventh Schedule is discussed, or revamp of seventh schedule is discussed, 
and the devolution of Union to States, and within State takes place in that context”. Mani Shankar 
Iyer has pointed out why there is mention of only 7th schedule, while there was no mention of 11th 
and 12th schedules. He also highlighted that “panchayat finances” also need to be given emphasis 
by the Finance Commission, not alone the urban local bodies. All the panelists highlighted the role 
of State Finance Commissions (SFCs) in ensuring stable flow of funds to the third tier. 
 
XIII. Link between GST Council and Finance Commissions  
 
Drabu (2019) flagged three questions. One, the need for new model of fiscal federalism, and the 
seeds of that thought came from the 14th FC that India will exclusively focus on “revenue sharing”, 
and not do the “expenditure underwriting”. Two, the need “resource sharing” instead of “revenue 
sharing” as India is a raw-material deficit economy. He explained that a fiscal architecture to be 
designed for “resource sharing” than revenue sharing. Three, the institutional relationship between 
GST Council and the Finance Commission. He asked, is there a need for both co-ordination and a 
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conflict resolution mechanism between these institutions. Post GST-compensation, is there any 
need for revenue deficit grant (Drabu, 2019).  
 
Against the backdrop of GST regime, is there a need to change “horizontal criteria”? Earlier, 
Finance Commissions have used the criteria “tax effort” in the horizontal devolution formula 
(Drabu, 2019). What criteria can replace that “tax effort” in the post-GST regime?  Drabu (2019) 
also pointed out that earlier Finance Commissions were looking at revenue deficit grants, pre-
compensation and post-compensation, and in post-GST regime, the entire mechanics of Finance 
Commission will undergo a change and in turn the inter-se allocation between these states. Drabu 
(2019) pointed out that 15th FC’s TOR blatantly violates the Constitution, and it is making effort 
to negate every single thing that 14th FC has done. Drabu (2109) urged why cannot the TOR of 
Finance Commissions be drafted by the GST Council or at least the Empowered Committee of 
Finance Ministers.  
 
 
XV. The Composition of Finance Commissions 
 
The IFF talks about the “growing prominence of economists in the Commissions after the 
economic reforms”, quite contrary to the initial FCs’ composition of more lawyers to interpret 
Constitutional clauses on federalism. This takes me to an upcoming empirical literature on “career 
theories” of a leader, whether a leader’s traits influence the policy outcomes? For instance, in the 
context of Western Europe, an analysis was done to examine – this is a paper published in Public 
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Choice16 - whether the “personal characteristics” (education, work experience, ideology/political 
affiliation) affect changes in public debt. In monetary-macro, we can ask this empirical question 
whether the personal characteristics of Central Bank Governor affects the policy rate decisions. 
Timothy Besley of London School also analysed the leadership effectiveness on policy outcomes. 
In fiscal federal literature, in future, such empirical questions may be asked by scholars, whether 
the personal characteristics of the Chairperson of Finance Commission influences the magnitude 
and criteria of tax transfers; and the debt-deficit dynamics at the subnational level (Chakraborty, 
2019). 
 
XVI. Model of Tax Sharing versus Grants  
 
Finally, I noted the absence of a cross-country backdrop on federalism experiences in the IFF. But 
I realize how different Indian fiscal federalism is from other country models. In other federations, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFT) is predominantly “grants”, not “tax transfers”. So such 
“fiscal equalization models” may be of different relevance to India. It is a must-read for the 
scholars who are interested in federalism, as it helps us to understand the nuances of federalism to 
“innovate” Finance Commissions better and to “explore” more empirical questions in fiscal 
federalism.  
 
To conclude, as eloquently put by Y V Reddy, 15th FC has a very big challenge in terms of 
incorporating the new institutional developments in Indian fiscal federalism. The fundamental 
                                                 
16 https://www.jstor.org/stable/24507522?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 
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premise, why first time ever, a group of States questioning the TOR of Finance Commission, needs 
to be dealt with “courage and wisdom” to continue the trust between Centre and the States. Once 
this is ensured, then comes the question of a new fiscal federalism model, whether India needs to 
continue “tax sharing” or switch on to a new “grant equalization” model.  
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